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T
he remnants of Tropical Storm Gaston dumped more
than a foot of rain on central Virginia in just one day in
August, creating raging floodwaters that caused millions
of dollars in damage and killed eight people. Within days, a few
parking facilities in downtown Richmond allegedly raised their
fees because many lots in the city’s Shockoe Bottom 
district were covered in a mass of mud and wrecked vehicles.
The threat of rapid markups for goods and services after
disasters like Gaston and Hurricane Isabel in 2003 is the
reason why Virginia passed an anti-price-gouging law last April.
North Carolina enacted a similar law in 2003 and the District
of Columbia did it 11 years earlier. Lawmakers want to protect
consumers from businesses deemed opportunistic.
In  fact, not every post-disaster 
price hike is predatory. Some price
increases are inevitable when a hurri-
cane or some other calamity throws
supply and demand out of whack. 
After a disaster, the total supply of
certain goods and services suddenly
drops — there may be less gasoline due
to power outages at service stations, for
example. The disaster also creates a
surge in demand for some items like
generators. In either case, prices of
those items tend to rise. Things become
even more complicated when supply
disruptions coincide with demand
surges, for instance, when people need
gas to fuel their generators.
In such situations, businesses want
to increase their output, but they can’t
unless they take extraordinary meas-
ures. Goods producers and retailers
may have to truck in fresh supplies from distant sources,
while service providers may have to bring in extra help. Since
these measures cost money, businesses must raise prices. Anti-
price-gouging laws usually permit moderate price increases,
which is why some industry groups aren’t concerned about
Virginia’s law. It seems to them like a good compromise that
both protects consumers and allows businesses to recover
their added costs.
But economists like Donald Boudreaux counter that if
businesses can’t raise prices beyond a certain level, they
may have to ration goods by limiting purchases. This pre-
vents items from going to the people who need them most.
“You have to make sure that existing supplies in the imme-
diate vicinity of the distressed area … are used as efficiently
as possible,” says Boudreaux, chairman of the economics
department at George Mason University. Anti-price-gouging
laws prevent this “economic triage” from taking place. 
This means that even businesses with inventories on hand
ought to be able to raise prices to market levels. Otherwise, “first
come, first serve” becomes the standard for determining who
gets what. The senior citizen who has a generator powering his
respirator may end up at the back of the line for gasoline and
get nothing, while the first person in line gets to refuel his gen-
erator so that he can keep his entertainment center running.
In addition, rising prices signal that an unmet demand exists.
This entices new suppliers into disaster-struck communities
with the promise of hefty profits. That’s important because
“you need to make sure that new supplies find their way into
distressed areas as quickly as possible,”
says Boudreaux. Anti-price-gouging laws
limit price increases, which “discourages
suppliers from outside of the disaster
area from putting forth the extra effort
to get vitally needed supplies to that area.”
Although higher prices boost the
availability of goods and services in the
medium and long run, one could argue
that supply remains relatively constant
in the short term. Variables that usually
influence supply, such as the state of
technology and the number of produc-
ers, can’t change immediately. To make
matters worse, flooded roads and power
outages may make it impossible for new
supplies to reach the market. 
Therefore, higher prices won’t
immediately result in, say, many more
bags of ice getting to many more
people. Instead, only those who are
willing and able to pay higher prices — no matter how out-
rageous they may seem — will get what they need. Some
people may simply go without.
Government agencies and charitable organizations could
meet unmet demand in the aftermath of a disaster. That way,
the higher prices would be spread over a wider population
beyond the individuals in need. However, buyers and suppli-
ers may be less motivated to prepare for future disasters if 
they think a white knight will save them, and that doesn’t 
always happen.
“No serious economist would ever claim that allocation [of
goods] according to prices is perfect,” says Boudreaux. Still,
he argues, it is a better way to allocate resources in emergen-
cies than the alternatives available with an anti-price-gouging
law in place. RF
All’s Fair in Love and War …
and Pricing?
There are good economic reasons for 
raising prices of essential goods following 
a natural disaster or major storm. But
most people seem to think that this prac-
tice is unfair. Consider the responses to
the following household survey question. 
Question: A hardware store has been
selling snow shovels for $15. The morning
after a large snowstorm, the store raises
the price to $20. Please rate this action. 
Response: Unfair, 82%; Acceptable, 18%
SOURCE: Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard
Thaler. “Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking:
Entitlements in the Market.” American Economic
Review, September 1986, vol. 76, no. 4, pp. 728-741.
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